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John Cann's study dealing with the Portuguese attempt to curb, if not eradicate, the pro-
independence African armies in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau is yet another 
indication of scholarly (and sometimes polemical) interest in how wars were lost by 
colonial (or major) powers. Vietnam and the second Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902) are 
cases in point of this near growth industry. By way of contrast, the (three) wars in 
Lusophone Africa have generated less popular interest than the Vietnamese or even 
Algerian wars, and the community of Africanists has tended to be more fascinated by 
anti-colonial success rather than by colonial failure. Such wars seem to be consigned to 
the musty world of case studies for military command and staff colleges. They have 
produced no major motion pictures or great war novels. These three African wars for 
independence have too small an audience if only because many Western commentators 
were fascinated by the political and economic ineptness or failures of those Angolan and 
Mozambiquan post-colonial regimes with Marxist-Leninist rhetoric and trappings. Few 
were the Americans or Canadians who had the requisite language skills and military 
expertise to write intelligently about the wars in Lusophone Africa.  
The basic argument is that Portugal ". . . mobilized an army, transported it many 
thousands of kilometers to its African colonies, established large logistical bases at key 
locations there to support it, equipped it with special weapons and matériel, and trained it 
for a very specialized type of warfare . . ." It did so, contends the author, ". . . without any 
previous experience, doctrine, or demonstrated competence in the field of either power 
projection or counterinsurgency warfare, and . . . without . . . any instructors who were 
competent in these specialties." (p. 1 for both quotations). Thus, what Dr. Cann termed 
the Portuguese way of war ". . . focused on a subdued, low-tempo style of fighting that 
was a function of its constrained resources and low technology." (p. 187)  
What is particularly appealing about this study by a retired US naval officer, who earned 
a doctoral degree in war studies from King's College of the University of London, is his 
demonstrable access to the Portuguese military establishment and sources. The author 
makes the most of his interviews and correspondence with those officers who fought in 
the three campaigns as well as of the Lisbon-based records of the armed forces. This 
enables him to track down the flow (and revisions), say, of counterinsurgency doctrine 
from the British and Americans. The Americans, however, tended to be ahistorical in 
terms of comparative civil-military affairs, and military lessons tended to be forgotten not 
long after they were written down. Only recently, for example, has there been a 
resurgence of studies dealing with US counterinsurgency in the Philippines in the 
Spanish-American War; the fascination in counterinsurgency literature had centered on 
the Huk rebellion in the Philippines just after the close of the Second World War.  
Such wars are difficult to fight for they often run counter to large-scale principles of 
troop organization, to say nothing of military sub-cultures that may emphasize different 
sets of career incentives, or civic cultures that place a premium on patience and even 
tolerate opaqueness in military results. Wars of this sort are fraught with consequences 
for the counterinsurgent power, as the American experience in Vietnam so cogently 
demonstrates. Cann's study is a welcome addition to the literature of comparative 
guerrilla warfare studies particularly because of its consistent concern with what the 
Portuguese armed forces learned, where they learned it, from whom they learned it, and 
how they passed on these lessons to the troops in the field. The author deftly weaves into 
his analysis and description reference to what the British, French, and Americans did 
(well or ineptly) or failed to do, and the consequences of such action or inaction.  
Particularly significant is his treatment of how the Portuguese armed forces developed a 
sustainable counterinsurgency doctrine, drawing upon previous French and British 
practice, and then implemented that doctrine in the field. What intrigues the author is how 
a relatively small nation, with a dwindling pool of manpower, and modest levels of 
technology managed to continue to wage war in three African territories (Guinea-Bissau, 
Angola, and Mozambique) for no less than thirteen years. Part of the success is due to 
Portugal's ability to recruit, equip, and train a wide array of specialized units from local 
populations, including Bushmen in Angola (who served with equal distinction in the 
South African Defense Force in Namibia). This offset the shortfall in the metropolitan 
recruitment area and reduced long-range troop transportation costs from Portugal to the 
African colonies. The metropolitan-recruited soldiers, however, became casualties at a 
higher proportionate rate than their African fellow soldiers, thus undercutting the 
argument that shifting the recruitment base would put the Africans at greater risk than 
their Portuguese comrades-in-arms. There was political opposition to the African wars in 
non-democratic Portugal, conscription evasion, and increased taxation; the colonial wars 
were terminated as a result of the 1974 military coup d'état which, much later, led to a 
democratic system and acceptance into the European community.  
This study is exemplary in its tight organization and attention to detail, which will make 
it attractive to military readers, and its topical arrangement of chapters facilitates 
comparative analysis with American, French, and British military doctrine, organizations 
and techniques. Paradoxically, the relative poverty of the Portuguese nation prompted its 
military to fashion its military organization and order of battle, as well as civic action and 
resettlement programs, in a parsimonious manner. Less was sometimes better, 
particularly when the Portuguese army reconfigured itself into a counterinsurgency 
machine by stressing the light infantry structure (which the Americans did not do when 
fighting in Vietnam) and integrated its African and non-African troops (which neither the 
British nor the French had done). The Portuguese military did hold the African 
nationalists at bay for quite some time and provided some degree of political space for 
the resolution of the conflict. They could not, however, compete with these nationalists in 
terms of legitimacy, as the author correctly notes (on p. 194). The bibliography, which 
includes works in both Portuguese and English, is quite helpful, but the index is not as 
detailed as it ought to be, and the four maps are only adequate. They author could have 
added more material on the role of the Portuguese African military forces in the First 
World War, some of whom did battle in Mozambique with the legendary German 
Colonel (later General) Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck, who held out against the British and 
their allies in German East Africa (later Tanganyika) throughout the entire First World 
War and earned the admiration of both friend and foe. It is his contention (on p. 95) that 
ever so little is known about Portugal's African army in the First World War; if so, why 
not enlighten the historians among his readers? Certainly, von Lettow-Vorbeck is well-
known as a superb guerrilla fighter who earned the highest German decoration, Pour le 
Mérite, from the Kaiser. His opponents merit some, if not necessarily equal, attention.  
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